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The Role of Account Length in Detecting Deception in 
Written and Orally Produced Autobiographical Accounts 
using Reality Monitoring 
Reality monitoring lie‐detection studies, like others that use raw frequency counts as primary 
data, seem consistently to underestimate the influence of the length of (or number of words 
in) the account. The decisions as to whether to standardise or not, or what method of 
standardisation to use, are rarely empirically driven, so it is still unclear as to whether reality 
monitoring is more effective before or after standardisation for length. Another factor that 
also has received little attention in the reality monitoring literature is whether statements are 
produced orally or in written form. To investigate these issues, 42 autobiographical 
statements, 21 truthful, and 21 deceptive, including 22 oral and 20 written accounts, were 
analysed before and after word count standardisation. Results showed that reality monitoring 
criteria only discriminated significantly between truthful and deceptive accounts when no 
attempt to control for word count was made. Also, oral statements contained more evidence 
of reality monitoring criteria before standardisation for word count, whereas written 
statements were denser and contained more evidence of reality monitoring criteria after 
standardisation. Implications are discussed.  
 
A variety of techniques have been developed by investigators to assess the veracity of 
statements of suspects and alleged victims in forensic investigations. However, many of these 
have not survived academic scrutiny or have not been tested with sufficient rigour to be 
considered reliable; these include Scientific Content Analysis, Investigative Resource 
Analysis, Verbal Behaviour Analysis, and Lexical Diversity (for reviews see Adams & 
Jarvis, 2006; Vrij, 2008). Nevertheless, perhaps the best known, more reliable, and most 
extensively tested techniques of verbal lie detection are criterion‐based content analysis 
(CBCA) and reality monitoring (RM)(Granhag, Strömwall & Landström, 2006; Masip, 
Sporer, Garrido & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000; Vrij, Mann, Kristen, 
& Fisher, 2007). 
At present, the discrimination rates for both CBCA and RM have been considered too low for 
full integration into the criminal justice system. Hence, as yet, RM has not been used in 
forensic investigations, and whereas CBCA has been recognised only in criminal court 
proceedings in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, its application has been 
limited to testing accounts derived from children‐witnesses/victims of sexual abuse 
(Vrij, 2008). 
Nevertheless, comparisons of CBCA and RM techniques have shown a number of advantages 
of the RM approach (Masip et al., 2005; Sporer, 1997; Vrij et al., 2000). For example, RM is 
less complex and potentially more cost‐effective to use, and a number of studies have shown 
that it discriminates better between truthful and deceptive accounts (Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Landström, 2006; Porter & Yuille, 1996; Sporer, 1997; Strömwall, Bengtsson, Leander, & 
Granhag, 2004; Vrij, 2000). Perhaps one of the most important reasons why RM might have 
more discriminatory power is that it is recognised as having a stronger theoretical basis 
(Masip et al., 2005). This happens primarily because the principles of CBCA were derived 
from child‐interviewers' practical experience, the RM framework has its roots in memory 
theory. 
The theoretical basis for RM can be found in Johnson and Ray's (1981) ideas concerning 
differences between memories of real events and memories of imagined experiences. 
According to this perspective, memories of real events are obtained through perceptual 
processes; therefore, they are more likely to contain perceptual details (e.g. sounds, colours, 
and details of smell), spatiotemporal details (e.g. details regarding the spatial arrangement of 
people or the time order of events), and affective details (details regarding information about 
feelings) than imagined or fabricated memories (Sporer, 2004; Vrij, 2000). In contrast, the 
memories of imagined events are internally derived; hence, they are less likely to contain the 
aforementioned details and are more likely to contain information regarding cognitive 
operations (e.g. thoughts, reasoning, and cognitive suppositions of sensory experiences). As 
noted previously, compared with other verbal statement lie‐detection approaches, such as 
CBCA, RM is considered by many to be relatively easy to use as it has fewer criteria and 
more clear‐cut distinctions (Sporer, 1997; Vrij, 2000); it is thus potentially more cost‐
effective in terms of interviewer or coder training. 
However, RM studies, like others that use raw frequency counts as primary data, seem 
consistently to underestimate the influence of a key methodological factor, namely the length 
of (number of words in) the account. Although the overall length of accounts per se has often 
been proposed as a potentially useful cue to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Porter & 
Yuille, 1996; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara & Bull, 2004; Vrij et al., 2000), particular problems 
arise when frequency data are used to measure more discrete variables, such as visual and 
cognitive information. In such cases, results can vary considerably depending not only on 
whether the accounts have been standardised for word count but also the actual method of 
standardisation (Masip et al., 2005). Consequently, decisions to standardise per se can affect 
the diagnostic validity of the criteria in separating truths from lies, particularly when the 
lengths of the truthful and deceptive accounts differ. This is a particular problem for RM as 
word count has been found to positively correlate with the entire gamut of RM criteria such 
that, the longer the accounts, the stronger the presence of the various RM criteria within them 
(Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot, & Mastroberardino, 2010). For example, it has been found 
that criteria such as visual information and cognitive information are more effective in 
discriminating between truthful and deceptive accounts before standardisation for word 
count, than after standardisation (Larson & Granhag, 2005; Masip et al., 2005). 
Decisions as to whether or not to standardise also tend to be very ad hoc. It is a common 
practice, for instance, to control for word count when statistically significant differences in 
length are found between truthful and deceptive accounts (Gnisci, Caso, & Vrij, 2010; 
Memon et al., 2010). Nevertheless, often length differences are found but no standardisation 
takes place (see, e.g. Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012). Also, there are instances in the general 
literature where the accounts did not differ significantly in the amount of words they 
contained, but they were still standardised for length; and, in other studies, for no clear 
reason, some criteria were standardised and others not (see, e.g. Vrij et al., 2004; Vrij et 
al., 2000). Moreover, even when the decision to standardise is taken, methods of 
standardisation can differ considerably. For example, a particularly common standardisation 
method is to calculate the number of raw frequencies of a particular RM criterion contained 
per 100 words of the account (Larson & Granhag, 2005; Strömwall & Granhag, 2005; Vrij et 
al., 2004). But other alternatives have included presence of cues per 50 words (Vrij et 
al., 2000), the transformation of raw frequencies into a 5‐point‐rating scale (Memon et 
al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2008) and even measuring raw frequencies as well as controlling for the 
duration of the account (in number of minutes) (Gnisci et al., 2010). Such is the complexity 
of and ambiguity associated with this issue that some authors have more or less given up and 
argued that when there are significant length differences between truthful and deceptive 
accounts, raw frequencies cannot be used because the raw criteria frequencies and the number 
of words used are confounded (e.g. Granhag, Strömwall, Landström, 2006; Strömwall et 
al., 2004). 
It is also important to note that the decision to standardise for word count or not is not simply 
a statistical or methodological issue; it is also conceptual. For instance, although some writers 
have advocated some kind of standardisation as a general principle when the length of 
accounts differs (e.g. Strömwall & Granhag, 2005; Sporer, 2004), it does not necessarily 
follow that this makes sense conceptually. The basic rationale for standardisation is that RM 
differences between truthful and deceptive accounts could simply be an artefact of general 
differences in length and density of words contained in the account. However, whilst this 
might appear logical, it arguably makes little sense to correct for word count if length per se 
is considered to be a reliable cue to deception (Colwell, Hiscock‐Anisman, & Memon, 2002; 
Memon et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2004). Indeed, it could be construed as entirely missing the 
point in terms of the rationale behind RM. RM was originally formulated on the idea that 
‘memories based in perception have better spatial, temporal, and sensory information’ 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981, p.82). There is no reference in the seminal RM papers by Johnson 
and colleagues (Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981) to the idea that 
truthful accounts will be richer in the density of RM criteria, but rather they will overall 
contain ‘more perceptual, spatial and temporal, semantic and affective information, and less 
information about cognitive operations’ (Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993, p.4). It could 
be argued, therefore, that standardising for word count differences is essentially an 
intervention that is not supported by the original theory, as it alters one of the core qualities of 
lies (i.e. they generally contain less information). 
Given this lack of clarity about how to deal with what appears to be a fundamental 
methodological issue in the operation of RM, it is difficult to see how one could possibly 
operationally apply RM measures within the criminal justice system as a way of 
discriminating truth from lies in accounts. Yet, although a number of researchers have 
recognised the problem, little systematic research has been conducted on this issue. In 
particular, we need to know exactly how the standardisation of accounts for number of words, 
or length, affects the role of RM criteria (both singularly and in combination) in 
discriminating lies from truths. 
Another potentially under‐researched factor that may affect the efficacy of RM in 
discriminating truths from lies is the mode in which the account is presented, that is whether 
it is spoken or written. Although some RM studies have used both written statements and oral 
accounts in their designs (e.g. Granhag et al., 2006; Manzanero & Diges, 1996), in these, no 
attempt was made to compare the effects of the two. Also, results from the few RM studies 
that have used written statements have presented inconsistent findings. For example, Sporer 
and Sharman (2006) reported that only realism and temporal information differentiated 
between truthful and deceptive accounts, whilst Barnier, Sharman, McKay, and Sporer 
(2005) found that truthful accounts were clearer and contained more affective information 
than deceptive ones. Moreover, in direct opposition to the predictions of RM theory, 
Barnier et al. (2005) also found that written truthful accounts contained more information 
regarding cognitive operations than deceptive accounts. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways in which oral and written statements may differ that 
may be relevant to lie detection (Beaugrande, 1984; Kroll, 1977). For example, the role of a 
writer can be construed as very different from that of a speaker. The speaker usually quickly 
processes ideas into words whilst both utilising and receiving (from the listener) non‐verbal, 
prosodic, and paralinguistic cues, which help the message evolve. The speaker, however, 
cannot easily look back or re‐examine at what he/she has stated; that is, it is difficult for 
him/her to process the message holistically. The writer, in contrast, normally has more 
opportunity to look back and make detailed corrections to produce a more thematically 
coherent message; however, he/she is not generally in a position to receive instant feedback 
in any form (Gumperz, Kaltman, & O'Connor, 1984). Also, oral accounts tend to be longer as 
speaking is much faster than writing (Chafe & Tannen, 1987; Halliday, 1989; Hidi & 
Hildyard, 1983; Tagg, 2009; Tannen, 1985). However, although the effects of the modality of 
the message and the medium used to communicate this message have been broadly assessed 
in the lie‐detection context (e.g. Adams & Jarvis, 2006; Carlson & George, 2004; Davis, 
Markus, & Walters, 2006; Lindholm, 2008), as previously noted, the effects for spoken 
language have not systematically been compared with those for written language in the RM 
literature. So, both written transcripts and transcripts based on oral testimonies have been 
used as if they were functionally identical. 
When considering the effects of oral and written accounts in relation to RM criteria, one 
might expect spoken accounts to display more information relevant to the RM criteria; that is 
unless standardised for length, oral accounts should receive higher RM scores than written 
accounts, irrespective of their veracity as overall they contain more words. However, in 
general, the evidence suggests that, with standardisation of length, oral narratives tend to 
have lower lexical density than written accounts, as they are not as well planned (and 
corrected etc.); hence, they generally contain numerous pauses, false starts, incomplete 
sentences repetitions and hesitations (Chafe & Tannen, 1987; Halliday, 1989, 2001). Thus, 
written discourse is more coherent and dense in terms of content‐words per clause than 
spoken language. It might, therefore, be predicted that, without standardisation, oral accounts, 
being longer, will tend to receive higher RM scores. However, as they are not as dense 
lexically, when word count standardisation takes place, they will tend to receive lower RM 
scores than written accounts. Although an exception to this might be found with the cognitive 
operations criterion. This should be present more often in oral accounts than written accounts, 
both before and after standardisation, as oral accounts tend to overall contain more first 
person pronouns, silent pauses and verbal fillers (e.g. um and uh), and words that may reflect 
uncertainty and hesitation (e.g. kind of, may be…), and subjective assumptions (e.g. it 
seemed to me that…; Pu, 2006). In contrast, written accounts are generally better prepared; 
hence, they tend not to contain words that reflect hesitation and uncertainty (Pu, 2006). This 
may be important, as it has been suggested that accounts rich in words that reflect 
equivocation or uncertainty in response to an open question are generally interpreted as 
associated with deception in lie‐detection settings (Adams & Jarvis, 2006; DePaulo et 
al., 2003). And significantly, within the RM framework, words used to express uncertainty 
and subjectivity (I think that he must have been present because…) are coded as cognitive 
operations. The presence of such words will, therefore, tend to increase both the density and 
presence of cognitive operation items coded in the accounts. 
Given these considerations, the aim of this paper is to conduct a brief preliminary 
investigation to determine systematically whether standardising accounts for word count 
affects the usefulness of the RM approach in discriminating between truthful and deceptive 
accounts, and whether this is moderated by the modality of the accounts; that is whether they 
are oral or written. Specifically, it was hypothesised that the RM criteria will be more 
effective in discriminating between truthful and deceptive accounts before word count 
standardisation than after. In addition, oral accounts will tend to produce higher RM scores 
than written accounts before word count standardisation (because they are longer), but lower 
RM scores after word count standardisation (because they are less dense). And finally, oral 
accounts will be richer in information regarding cognitive operations both before and after 
word count standardisation. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were an opportunity sample consisting of 21 members of the general public 
and University of Liverpool students (mean age = 25.80; SD = 7.05); there were eight men 
and 13 women. There were no exclusion criteria other than participants had to be older than 
17 years. All participants volunteered in response to an advertisement posted in the 
University website. No reimbursement was offered. This research was conducted in 
accordance with BPS and APA research ethics guidelines and approved by the University of 
Liverpool Institute of Psychology Health and Society Research Ethics Committee. 
Materials 
The measures were as follows. 
Life experiences inventory 
As autobiographical memories have been used as stimulus materials in numerous lie‐
detection studies (e.g. Ball & O'Callaghan, 2008; Barnier et al., 2005; Johnson, Foley, 
Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Masip et al., 2005; Sporer & Sharman, 2006), they were used as 
stimuli here. An adaptation of the kind of life experiences inventory (LEI) used by Garry, 
Manning, Loftus, and Sherman (1996) and Paddock et al. (1999) was, therefore, devised to 
help participants to generate the stimulus information. The LEI protocol listed three types of 
events: (1) having an indoors or outdoors accident; (2) being attacked by an insect/animal; 
and (3) having an unpleasant medical operation. Some examples of the first and third 
categories were also provided (such as sports injury, pet run over by a car, lost in a public 
space for more than an hour, home broken into, and painful dental surgery). Participants were 
instructed to look at the list of the three types of event, consider if they had previously 
experienced any of them, and then to perform two tasks according to the following 
instructions: first, ‘Please describe, in as much detail as possible, one of these events that you 
have experienced in the form of a narrative. If you realise that you have been involved in 
more than one of these events, please describe the one you remember the best. Your response 
will be audio recorded and timed. Feel free to ask as many questions as you wish before the 
task starts BUT remember that no questions will be answered after the timer starts’; and 
second, ‘Please identify which of these events you have never experienced. Please 
identify only one of the events you have never experienced and generate an imaginary story 
around it. In other words, please create a whole fictitious story and enrich it with as many 
details as possible to make it look like a genuinely true experience. We would like you to talk 
about this event so that if someone who did not know whether this event had happened to you 
were to read your account, they would believe that this event had in fact happened to you. 
Please remember that your accounts should be freely invented. You should not describe 
friends' experiences, describe events taken from books or films, and describe personal 
experiences that had been modified. Your response will be audio recorded and timed. Feel 
free to ask as many questions as you wish before the task starts BUT remember that no 
questions will be answered after the timer starts’. 
Reality monitoring criteria 
For RM coding, an RM framework was devised. This consisted of a list of five RM criteria 
(perceptual information, cognitive operations, temporal information, spatial information, and 
affective information) and a set of descriptions of their definitions derived from Sporer 
(2004) and Vrij (2000). The protocol required coders to score numerically the number of 
occasions where perceptual information, cognitive operations, temporal information, spatial 
information, and affective information was present. This resulted in a score for each criterion 
and a total criterion score. The criteria (with examples) were defined to the coders as follows. 
1. Perceptual Information: the presence sensorial experiences such as sounds (e.g. ‘he really 
shouted at him’) or visual details (e.g. ‘I saw him entering the room’). 
2. Spatial information: the presence of information about locations (e.g. ‘It was in a park’) or the 
spatial arrangement of people/objects (e.g. ‘the man was sitting left from his wife’ or ‘the 
lamp was partially hidden behind the curtains’). 
3. Remembered feelings (affect): how well the person remembers feelings (accounts of 
subjective mental states) from the event (e.g. ‘Joseph was very scared’). 
4. Cognitive operations: evidence in the narratives of various cognitive activities, such as 
thoughts or reasoning (e.g ‘I must have had my coat on, as it was very cold that night’) and 
cognitive suppositions of sensory experiences (e.g. ‘She seemed quite clever’). This criterion 
also includes descriptions of inferences made by the participant at the time of the event (e.g. 
‘it made me think at the moment how nice it could be’). 
5. Temporal information: the presence of information about when the event happened (e.g. ‘it 
was early in the morning’) or explicitly describing a sequence of events (e.g. ‘as soon as the 
guy entered the pub the girl started smiling’). 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in a lie‐detection study. The participants were unknown 
to the experimenter, and the exact purpose of the study was unknown to them. Participants 
were then given the LEI protocol as previously described. When describing a truthful event, 
participants were also reminded to report an event only of which they were 100% sure. Ten 
participants were asked to report their accounts orally, and the remaining 11 were asked to 
write down their accounts. 
Obviously, a problem with the use of materials of this kind is the establishment of ground 
truth for the ‘truthful’ accounts. An obvious way round the problem of ground truth would be 
to expose participants to events controlled by the experimenter. However, this inevitably 
means the event will have little emotional significance to the individuals concerned and the 
design will have poor ecological validity. Also, unless participants were being deliberately 
disruptive and uncooperative, it seems unlikely that they would simply manufacture accounts, 
whether in whole or part. And even if they did, this would tend to reduce the distinction 
between truthful and untruthful reports such that the findings would err on the side of caution, 
an outcome that could be construed as preferable in this area. Consequently, the approach 
used here has been popular amongst lie‐detection researchers (see, e.g. Barnier et al., 2005; 
Johnson et al., 1988; Santtila, Roppola, & Niemi, 1999; Sporer & Sharman, 2006) and has 
received support in perhaps the most complete meta‐analytic study of RM research (Masip et 
al., 2005); the main advantage being that participants have some emotional engagement with 
the experimental process. 
Within the constraints of the sample size, deceptive and truthful conditions were also 
counterbalanced within conditions, so 42 accounts were ultimately recorded and used within 
a mixed 2 × 2 (modality: written accounts versus oral accounts ×  truthfulness: real event 
versus fabricated event) design. Oral accounts were audio recorded and transcribed into 
written form, and all accounts were timed. 
The 42 autobiographical accounts, consisting of 22 oral and 20 written accounts, were then 
scored by two lie‐detection researchers using the RM framework previously described. Both 
were researchers in the area of lie‐detection and familiar with the mechanics and theoretical 
underpinnings of the RM approach. They were also given an opportunity to familiarise 
themselves with the RM coding protocol before beginning the scoring process. Both coders 
were blind as to the truth status of the accounts, or whether they were oral or written, 
although verbal fillers (e.g. um and uh) were present only in the oral transcripts. These fillers 
were not removed from the transcripts; however, the coders were not aware of their purpose 
and function or that they were confined to oral testimonies. The principal coder scored all 
accounts, whereas the secondary coder scored 25% of the accounts, including truthful 
deceptive, oral, and written accounts. Intra‐class correlation agreement and Pearson's 
correlations showed that, in terms of applying the RM criteria, there was high and significant 
inter‐coder agreement between the two judges (ICC = 0.90−0.96; r  = 0.84−0.96). 
Results 
Preliminary analysis of accounts 
Preliminary analyses using 2 × 2 (modality: written accounts versus oral 
accounts × truthfulness: real event versus fabricated event) mixed ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the second factor showed that the truthful accounts contained significantly more 
words (M = 382.62, SD = 260.74) than the deceptive accounts (M = 305.33, 
SD = 266.67); F(1, 19) = 6.94, p = 0.016; η2p = 0.27. Similarly, the truthful accounts were 
longer in terms of time spent (in seconds) producing them (M = 362.62, SD = 271.16) than 
the deceptive accounts (M = 301.14, SD = 224.04); F(1,19) = 7.54, p = 0.013; η2p = 0.28. 
Truthful accounts were also more fluent, producing significantly more words per second 
(M = 1.69, SD = 1.35) than deceptive accounts (M = 1.60, SD = 1.33); F(1, 
19) = 8.30, p = 0.010; η2p = 0.30. None of these effects was influenced by the order in which 
the accounts were presented. 
Between subjects main effects were found for modality. Specifically, oral accounts contained 
significantly more words (M = 510.00, SD = 274.90) than the written accounts (M = 193.04, 
SD = 97.79); F(1, 19) = 12.90, p = 0.002, η2p. = 0.40. The written accounts were longer in 
terms of time spent (in seconds) producing them (M = 477.95, SD = 250.78) than the oral 
accounts (M = 171.20, SD = 83.60); F(1, 19) = 13.54, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.42. Speakers' rate of 
word production was thus higher, producing significantly more words per second (M = 2.99, 
SD = 0.42) than writers (M = 0.42, SD = 0.10); F(1, 19) = 395.04, p = 0.001, η2p  = 0.95. There 
were no significant interaction effects. 
Reality monitoring results before word count standardisation 
The RM frequencies before word standardisation were then analysed using a series of six, 
2 × 2 (modality: written accounts versus oral accounts × truthfulness: real event versus 
fabricated event) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor; one for each 
of the five RM criteria, and one for the Total RM score. Total RM scores were calculated by 
adding scores for perceptual, spatial, affective, and temporal information and deducting 
scores for cognitive operations. 
As predicted, mean scores were higher for the truthful accounts for all RM criteria with the 
exception of cognitive operations. However, significant effects were found only for Total RM 
scores F(1,19) = 18.05, p = 0.001, spatial information F(1,19) = 17.79, p = 0.001, and 
temporal information F(1,19) = 8.32, p = 0.010 (Table 1). 
Table 1. RM mean (SD) frequency counts as a function of truthfulness before and after 
standardisation of word count 
 
 
 RM, reality monitoring; SD, standard deviation.  * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01. 
Although mean scores for all of the criteria were higher for oral accounts than written 
accounts, a significant main effect for modality was only found for cognitive 
information F(1,19) = 8.38, p = 0.009, although there were near significant trends for 
temporal information F(1,19) = 4.22, p = 0.054, and spatial 
information F(1,19) = 3.53, p = 0.076 (Table 2). No interactions between truthfulness and 
modality were found for any of the analyses. 
Table 2. RM mean (SD) frequency counts as a function of modality before and after standardisation 
of word count 
 
 
 RM, reality monitoring; SD, standard deviation.  * p < 0.01. 
Results after word count standardisation 
To standardise word count, the RM raw scores were re‐calculated per 100 words of account; 
that is raw frequencies per 100 words (e.g. of this method, see Larson & Granhag, 2005; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2005; Vrij et al., 2004). 
The frequencies after standardisation were again analysed using a series of six, 2 × 2 
(modality: written accounts versus oral accounts × truthfulness: real event versus fabricated 
event) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor. Analyses of the RM 
scores after standardisation showed no significant effects or effects approaching significance, 
for truthfulness, for any of the RM criteria, including Total scores (Table 1). 
However, main effects for modality were found for the perceptual 
information F(1,19) = 23.19, p = 0.001; spatial information F(1,19) = 9.69, p = 0.006; 
cognitive information F(1,19) = 7.41, p = 0.014, temporal 
information F(1,19) = 12.12, p = 0.002 and Total RM scores F(1,19) = 59.09, p = 0.001 
(Table 2). In each case, written accounts were richer in RM criteria. Again, no interactions 
between truthfulness and modality were found for any of the analyses. 
Sample‐size considerations 
Because of the small sample sizes a power analysis was conducted to ensure that the non‐
significant effects were not simply a feature of sample size. Results showed that to achieve a 
power value greater than 0.80, the non‐significant effect with the largest effect size would 
need a sample size in excess of 2,500 to be significant at p < 0.05. We would argue that if the 
appropriate level of statistical power can only be achieved with a sample size of this 
magnitude, the results would effectively have no practical relevance. 
Discussion 
The present results suggest that the ability of RM criteria to discriminate between truthful and 
deceptive accounts is affected by word count or length standardisation. As hypothesised, 
although significant individual criterion effects were found only for spatial information and 
temporal information, total RM scores were more effective in discriminating between truthful 
and deceptive accounts before word count standardisation than after. In fact, none of the 
criteria differentiated between truthful and deceptive accounts after standardisation. 
Moreover, these effects on the prediction of veracity were not moderated by modality. In 
general, therefore, the present results appear to lend some support to previous findings 
suggesting that some RM criteria are more able to discriminate between truthful and 
deceptive accounts if there is no attempt to control for word count (e.g. Masip et al., 2005; 
Larson & Granhag, 2005). 
If the present results have any generality in this respect, they may have some interesting 
implications for the diagnostic use of RM criteria. As mentioned previously, it could be 
argued that standardising accounts for word count constitutes an intervention, which is not 
fully justified by the original theory (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993). However, 
one of the drawbacks of using unstandardized frequencies is that they make it difficult to 
establish normative criteria for comparisons within and across studies, and for the assessment 
of individual cases. In contrast, if all relevant studies use a standardised measure of the raw 
frequencies (e.g. per 100 words), then in principle, researchers might be able to establish 
normative data for truthful and deceptive accounts against which individual cases could be 
compared. But this might also present something of a paradox for researchers and 
practitioners; there would be little point standardising scores if to do so would mean 
rendering RM criteria relatively ineffective in predicting veracity. 
Another obvious issue to consider is that, given word count per se seems to significantly 
predict veracity, if we are not going to standardise scores for word count, is there actually any 
point bothering with the RM criteria at all? Would it not be simpler just to use word count to 
predict whether accounts are more likely to be truthful? A brief examination of the relevant 
effect sizes in the present data suggests otherwise. For example, the effect size (Cohen's d) 
for the difference between truthful and deceptive accounts using total RM scores is 0.62; in 
contrast, those for word count per se and time spent are only 0.30 and 0.25, respectively. This 
suggests that the RM criteria may potentially outperform word count per se in predicting 
veracity. It can also be noted that, notwithstanding the finding that, other things being equal, 
truthful accounts tend to be shorter than deceptive ones (Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & 
Twitchell, 2004), a recent meta‐analysis of linguistic cues accessed by computer programs 
has questioned whether word count per se can generally be considered a reliable cue to 
deceptive behaviour (Hauch, Blandón‐Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2012).This finding is in line 
with research using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) computer software, which 
also shows that length per se is not a reliable cue to deception (Masip, Bethencourt, Lucas, 
Sánchez‐San Segundo, & Herrero, 2012; Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala, & Lee, 2014). In 
other words, to predict veracity with any degree of accuracy, the variable of length needs to 
be considered in conjunction with other cues and with reference to the conditions under 
which the study has been conducted. 
Importantly, the results also showed that there was no significant difference in the ability of 
oral and written accounts to discriminate between truthful and deceptive accounts (i.e. there 
were no significant interactions between truthfulness and modality), either before or after 
standardisation. This would suggest that either could potentially be used to help establish 
veracity at a broad statistical level, if the RM criteria are applied without standardisation for 
word count. However, the task of establishing RM criteria through which to judge individual 
cases remains a very significant challenge if RM is to be applied in the field. 
In addition to the findings regarding the effects word count and word count standardisation 
on predicting veracity, there was some support for the hypothesis that, regardless of whether 
accounts are truthful or deceptive, oral accounts tend to be longer and, therefore, produce 
higher RM scores than written accounts before word count standardisation (all means were in 
the appropriate direction, but a significant effect was only found for cognitive information). 
Also as predicted, however, the position was reversed after word count standardisation; thus, 
after word count standardisation, regardless of the truthfulness of the accounts, total RM 
scores were significantly higher for written accounts; that is written accounts were denser in 
terms of temporal, spatial, perceptual, and total RM scores. This seems to be in line with the 
rationale provided earlier arising from the different roles of speakers and writers (Chafe & 
Tannen, 1987; Halliday, 1989, 2001; Pu, 2006), and an obvious implication of these findings 
is that oral and written accounts should never be treated as equivalent either within or across 
studies (see, e.g. Granhag, Strömwall, & Landström, 2006; Manzanero & Diges, 1996). 
Moreover, if written accounts overall tend to be denser in terms of RM criteria than the oral 
accounts, and are easier to process, one might question why written accounts are used so 
rarely in RM research. Finally, it can be noted that there was support for the prediction that 
oral accounts will be richer in information regarding cognitive operations both before and 
after word count standardisation. The results showed a significant effect of modality on 
cognitive information both before and after word count standardisation, such that oral 
accounts showed more cognitive information. Given the general failure of cognition 
information to predict veracity, either before or after word count standardisation, this again 
emphasises the importance of not assuming that written and oral accounts equivalent in terms 
of their effects on RM scores. For example, a simple comparison of an oral with a written 
account might give the spurious impression that the oral account is more likely to be 
deceptive. This may be particularly significant in that the cognitive information criterion is 
often considered the weakest RM criterion for predicting veracity (Granhag et al., 2006; 
Masip et al., 2005; Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij, 2008), and there has been some scepticism 
surrounding its use (i.e. Masip et al., 2005; Sporer & Sharman, 2006; Vrij et al., 2004). For 
example, contrary to the RM theory, cognitive information scores have been often been found 
to be higher in truthful accounts than in the deceptive ones before word count standardisation. 
To conclude, obviously the present study was limited in many respects, and the present 
findings must be interpreted with considerable caution. The most obvious limitations were 
the very small sample size and the lack of control over ground truth. Moreover, even though 
the LEI procedure used here could be construed as more ecologically valid than a laboratory 
manipulation involving presentation of some kind of scenario of low emotional salience, the 
motivation for participants to lie was arguably lower than would occur in a real‐life high‐
stakes context. This may be important in that high‐stakes situations in which the motivation 
to lie is strong may produce more reliable cues to deception (DePaulo & Morris, 2004; Porter 
& ten Brinke, 2010). A major challenge for future research on this topic, therefore, is not only 
to replicate the findings on a larger sample but also to use materials that are more directly 
relevant to the forensic context. 
However, perhaps the major problem facing RM researchers is that of developing a protocol 
that might actually be useful for forensic investigators examining individual cases (Masip et 
al., 2005). As noted earlier, perhaps one of the more discouraging features of the present 
findings is that the RM criteria were not discriminating after standardisation; this suggests 
that it could potentially be very difficult to develop normative criteria, which could be used in 
the field to classify individual cases. Given this, perhaps one way forward might be to 
explore the relative efficacy of other ways of standardising word count, such as cues per 50 
words (Vrij et al., 2000), the transformation of raw frequencies into a 5‐point‐rating scale 
(Memon et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2008), and controlling for the duration of the account 
(Gnisci et al., 2010) or even combinations of these. 
Another possible avenue for inquiry is to examine the interaction between RM criteria and 
the use of verbal fillers (e.g. um and uh), which are found, as here, in oral accounts. Some 
investigators have argued that, in contrast with equivalent micro‐level non‐verbal behaviours 
(e.g. muscle micro movements), these kinds of paralinguistic cues may have been 
underestimated in lie‐detection research (Brennan & Williams, 1995; Linell, 1982, 1998). 
The functions of such paralinguistic cues have variously been described as both accidental 
and intentional (Corley & Stewart, 2008), biophysical (e.g. essential in breathing and 
articulation), psychological (e.g. reflecting stress and anxiety), communicative (signalling 
new information to the speaker), emotional, and linguistic (dividing the discourse into 
clauses/themes) (Esposito, Stejskal, Smekal, & Bourbakis, 2007). Also, clinically, they have 
been described as indicators of characteristics, such as emotional instability (Mahl, 1959) 
and, psycholinguistically, as a sign of limited preparedness (Maclay & Osgood, 1959). These 
features suggest that they may have potential as cues for lie‐detection, especially if combined 
with other cues. It should also be emphasised, that as yet, we have little comparative data on 
the relative efficacy of RM and alternative more complex computerised word count deception 
detection techniques. For example, the LIWC software provides 72 linguistic dimensions of 
speech, which can be further grouped into larger linguistic categories (e.g. linguistic 
processes, psychological processes, personal concerns, and spoken categories). Although 
some success has been reported using LIWC with both adults and children, it has yet to be 
compared with RM (Williams et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, in the meantime, at the very least, the present results suggest that when judging 
the veracity of accounts using RM criteria, treatment of word count and the modality in 
which an account is presented appear to be variables that should be investigated 
systematically, and measured and applied consistently, if researchers wish to compare and 
replicate findings within and across studies. 
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